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CRAFT GUILDS, APPRENTICESIllP AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
IN PRE-MODERN EUROPE I 
The origins and nature of technological invention and innovation in the pre-modem 
economy are still very much a 'black box' . In some respects this is because, compared 
with heroic 'macro-inventions ' (Mokyr 1990), it is far harder to identify the kind of 
piecemeal, small-scale, anonymous innovations at the margin which dominated 
technological progress in this period (Coleman 1973; Kellenbenz 1974). However, the 
difficulty is compounded by certain long-standing assumptions about pre-modem 
manufacture, and in particular by the view that craft guilds were a major obstacle, 
possibly the main obstacle, to technological advance. Scholars trained by institutional 
neo-Darwinism to rationalize an economic institution that survives as eo ipso 
'efficient' , still state categorically that craft guilds -- which provided the main 
institutional framework for European urban manufacture for seven hundred years or 
more -- were simply organized interest groups bent on redistributive rent-seeking, and 
thus reactionary opponents to technological progress (e.g .Mokyr 1990: 77, 178-9, 
191,258-9, 298). 
In this, of course, they are simply echoing a line of thought that reaches back through 
Adam Smith to the thirteenth century. Yet such a reassuring portrait of pre-modem 
obscurantism is not without its problems. Although critics accept that craft guilds only 
turned sour during the late Middle Ages, the sixteenth or even the seventeenth century 
(Mokyr 1990: 259 n.19), following two, three or perhaps four centuries during which 
they appear to have been associated with uninhibited economic growth, it is hard to 
I This paper was fIrst discussed at the Colloquium on History and economics : 
skills and training at King 's College, Cambridge in July 1994; my thanks to Paul Ryan 
for inviting me to take part, and to Michael Sonenscher in his role as discussant. I 
have also received valuable comments from Francesco Galassi, Mary Morgan, Gunnar 
Persson, Maarten Prak, and Keith Snel!. 
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explain why it should have taken so long for their fundamental drawbacks to stand 
revealed. I shall argue in this paper that the accepted view of craft guilds 
misunderstands their main purpose and effects . In the first part, I analyze the guild 
structure as a firm and argue that the primary goal of craft guilds was to provide 
adequate skills training through apprenticeship. In the second part, I suggest that a 
significant albeit unintended effect of the craft guild's investment in skills was to 
promote technological invention and diffusion. In the third and final part, I take some 
recent advances in the theory of the fmn as a structure of governance, which indicate 
how different property rights interact with different forms of technology to establish 
long-run organizational equilibria associated with distinct paths of technological 
invention and innovation, to suggest that guilds favoured kinds of technology which 
reinforced the specific property rights of the craft shop, and opposed technology which 
undermined those rights . In support of these claims, I briefly compare the 
technological preferences of guild-based manufacture with those of proto-industry and 
centralized factory production, and suggest reasons why proto-industry was effectively 
a technological 'dead end'. 2 
Most economic explanations of the guild assume that it performed one or more of the 
following functions: it acted as a monopolistic cartel, both as buyer of raw materials 
and as seller of its products (Mickwitz 1936); it enforced quality standards, 
particularly outside its community where its products were little or not at all known; 
it provided stable incomes and social security in highly unstable markets (Gustafsson 
1991); it acted as a bargaining force in narrow markets in which agents normally held 
market power (Persson 1988: 53) ; and it worked as a political and administrative unit, 
2 We know very little about the distinctive regional and national traits in craft 
organization which began to be defined during the late fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries (Turnau 1988); lacking modem comparative studies , the ' craft guild ' 
discussed below is something of an ideal type . 
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protecting its members from expropriation by opportunistic urban elites, which in 
exchange demanded that it collect capital tax and tie apprentices for abnormally long 
periods of time so as to provide their city with an ever ready supply of military 
manpower (Hickson & Thompson 1991). 
The only views among these which contrast specifically with our hypothesis are that 
craft guilds exerted monopoly power and that apprenticeship served to provide towns 
with soldiers . The interpretation of guilds as monopolists , stated forcefully by 
Mickwitz in 1936 and flIlIlly embedded in the subsequent literature (Cipolla 1963: 
411-14, 415-16, 426-9; Thrupp 1963: 253; Gustaffson 1991, who also draws an 
analogy between guilds and producer cooperatives) does not withstand closer scrutiny. 
Where cartels must fix output quotas to achieve their goals, it can be shown that guild 
regulations setting output quotas were seldom enforced and where cartels must set 
price mininw and quality maxinw, we find that pre-modern guilds and urban 
regulations were invariably concerned with establishing price maxinw and quality 
mininw. This of course encouraged competition through improved quality and reduced 
input costs (Hickson and Thompson 1991 ; see also Hirshler 1954; Thrupp 1963 : 231, 
246-7, 252,263 , 275; Epstein S. 1991 : 100).3 
3 As I discuss below, barriers to entry for trained masters were generally low, and 
urban governments were willing to allow master artisans to practice without talcing up 
guild membership, thus further undercutting any cartelization of supply. This made it 
very hard for forms of oligopoly and attendant cartelization to emerge and persist for 
long periods of time; a significant exception seems to have been constituted by guilds 
which had a technological edge (a 'secret', as discussed below) that gave them supra-
normal profits (see the discussion of the Bolognese silk industry by Poni 1990). 
Lacking significant technological advantages , guild-based cartelization might emerge 
as a short-run phenomenon, but it cannot explain the guilds ' long-term survival . 
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The view that apprenticeship was a non-economic, defence supplying feature of craft 
guilds also fails , when we observe that urban crafts in highly corporatist medieval and 
early modem Italy never possessed military functions (Sestan 1966); conversely, in 
several parts of Europe (such as Spain and southern France) craft guilds were not 
formally established before the fifteenth or even the sixteenth centuries (Zemon Davis 
1966: 50), several centuries after towns had to establish specialized militia to defend 
themselves .' 
Through a process of elimination we seem to have been left with the view that craft 
guilds were set up to enforce quality control and to provide social welfare for their 
members . These seem weak foundations to raise a general theory of craft guilds upon. 
Institutionalized quality control may have been needed to reduce assymmetries of 
information between buyers and sellers of durable consumer goods and promote 
sales ,s and guilds would have made it easier to monitor standards (persson 1988: 52-
3); however, cartelization of this kind was best suited for export markets attended by 
merchant middlemen, for in domestic , small-scale markets quality could be monitored 
more cheaply through less formal arrangements , like the bazaar-like bunching together 
of shops in the same street that was such a salient feature of urban manufacture in our 
period. The enforcement of product quality alone does not adequately explain why 
, The late emergence of guilds in some parts of Europe also undermines Hickson' s 
and Thompson' s main claim that guilds served to protect their artisan members from 
capital expropriation by urban elites . 
S Information assymmetries arise for goods whose quality can only be established 
ex post. This applies both to commodities in export markets (where quality control 
helps to establish producers' and merchants ' reputation) and to common consumer 
goods produced for local markets like shoes, metal ware, pottery etc. 
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guilds also proliferated in trades catering mainly to local markets .6 Similarly, welfare 
support to act as a buffer against rapid market fluctuations and changes in life-cycle 
income could have been provided by other, equally or more effective institutions like 
religious fraternities, urban provisioning structures, kinship networks and the like. 7 
TIlis is not to argue that medieval and early modem guilds did not also take on these 
functions . It will become apparent below, however, that quality enforcement and 
welfare support were necessary but not sufficient conditions for the guilds' emergence 
and survival; their purpose was to provide subsidiary 'non-collective social benefits ' 
(Olson 1965: 67) , which raised the cost to guild members of defaulting on their duties 
and of free-riding on their privileges in the main sphere of guild activity. In other 
words, these and other roles (including political , military or fiscal functions) may well 
have aided individual guilds to solve the free-rider problem; but they cannot have been 
the reason for setting up craft guilds in the first place, nor can they explain why guilds 
dominated European manufacture for the half millennium preceding industrialization. 
The primary function8 of craft associations becomes apparent if we focus on the main 
technical and organizational elements shared by their constituent members. Guilds and 
workshops are usually discussed separately , the guild as a form of union or cartel, the 
6 Adam Smith's view that consumer pressure was the only form of necessary 
control seems too optimistic (1976: 144-5; see e.g. Hirschman 1970: 23) . 
7 Once a guild had been established, on the other hand, it might have been more 
effective than other welfare-providing institutions in monitoring free riding on benefits , 
since its normal economic activities would have given it a more accurate knowledge 
of conditions among its membership . 
8 By which I mean a function that was both necessary and sufficient for guilds to 
emerge and survive over time . I discuss the reasons why guilds may have emerged in 
the firs t place in section VI below. 
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workshop as a family-based, self-contained unit of production, the link between the 
two being a postulated 'pre-capitalist' egalitarian ethos expressed in statutory 
limitations on the size of the workshop. No-one to date has connected the specific 
technical and organizational characteristics of the craft shop with the purpose and 
rationale of guilds . 9 
I suggest instead that the pre-modern artisan workshop should be understood as a 
governance structure similar to the modern flnn, whose main purpose was to make the 
most efficient use of family and outside skilled labour. On this view, the 
apprenticeship contract and the craft guild are to be understood as interdependent 
solutions to the problem of opportunistic behaviour by masters and apprentices . The 
advantage of this explanation over current alternatives is that it provides a simple 
rationale both for craft apprenticeship and for the emergence and survival of craft 
guilds as non-monopolistic organizations providing a collective good, namely training 
in skills . 10 
9 A theoretical emphasis on the size of the workshop rather than on its technology 
explains the literature's fascination with large-scale urban workshops (' manufactures '). 
These are seen as a major institutional departure from the family-based craft unit of 
production (see e.g. Howell 1986; Wiesner 1986), even though in strictly 
technological and organizational terms they were similar: Sonenscher (1987, 1989) 
makes this point with his concept of a ' core' of large shops and a 'periphery' of sub-
contractors within eighteenth-century French trades. 
10 This argument does not require the existence of formally structured guilds . It 
does however imply that past a certain technical threshold of specialization, producers 
will organize informally to establish collective rules of apprenticeship and repress free-
riding. Gay Davies (1956: I), for example, suggests that the English Statute of 
Apprentices unified under a single code both the formal rulings of incorporated 
boroughs and towns and the informal practices of unincorporated centres and the 
6 
II 
Since Adam Smith's attack on apprenticeship laws as a means of restricting access to 
the labour market (Smith 1976: 133, 136-7), the economics of pre-modern 
apprenticeship has been virtually ignored. The length of training required (which in 
Smith's England was still fixed by the 1563 Statute of Artificers at seven years)11 
appearing to be out of all proportion to the skills required for even the most complex 
trade, its purpose could only be to exclude competition. Never mind that Smith got 
carried away and underestimated the complexity of transmitting what are essentially 
tacit, 'embodied' skills which cannot be formulated explicitly or symbolically, through 
either the written or the spoken word (Bloch 1991);12 his argument that 
apprenticeship served to maintain a monopsony over labour seems at first blush 
unassailable and has since become widely accepted. 
countryside. See also Epstein S. 1991 : 77-8. The medieval religious movement of the 
Umiliati, which was associated in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries with 
highly mobile, technically skilled woollen weavers (ibidem: 93-8), seems to have 
combined the skills-enhancing properties of the guild and the security-enhancing 
properties of journeymen's associations (discussed below), by means of a loose 
network of urban monasteries to which the workers were attached. 
11 The choice of a national norm of seven years was dictated by London custom, 
which was established during the fourteenth century; however, the Statute of Artificers 
was unable to stamp out local variations entirely (Ounlop 1912: 73, 83, 92, 134-5). 
12 It is clear that there was no feasible alternative to apprenticeship for transmitting 
practical , non verbal knowledge, including how to run a small business; even today's 
formal schooling is not an effective substitute. The contention that the most difficult 
craft of all, agricultural husbandry, required no formal training (Smith 1976: 141 -2) 
is disputed by Mitch 1994. 
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Smith' s indictment does not, however, explain why apprenticeship laws evoked so 
little hostility from the public at large, and indeed why town governments (which 
tended to legislate against producers and in favour of consumers, including the 
merchants who bought the crafts ' output for sale abroad, and which were willing to 
undercut guild controls over entry in other areas) seem never to have acted against 
such restrictions . Smith also implied that apprenticeship would only survive where 
corporations could enforce their laws strictly; yet there is evidence that similar, albeit 
informal rules of apprenticeship applied where guilds did not formally exist. 13 Thus , 
it would seem that apprenticeship fulfLlled positive requirements which were 
recognized as such, and accepted, both by master and apprentice and by the wider 
public . 14 
13 Gay Davies 1956: 11,125, 263-7; Sonenscher 1987: 48 ff. See also above, n.5. 
14 Although pre-industrial apprenticeship was invariably very long, the duration 
varied enormously across trades and was clearly not just a function of the level of 
required skills . An alternative explanation based on human capital theory could be that 
the length of apprenticeship varied on the basis of expected future earnings, discounted 
for the costs of training . Assuming that the loss in potential earnings at the present 
level of skills during apprenticeship was less than the gains in lifetime earnings from 
having higher skills, the length of the apprenticeship would vary in proportion to the 
difference between present and expected future earnings. The higher that expected 
difference in income, the longer an apprentice would be willing to wait, i.e. work for 
a sub-standard wage for the master (this used to be the explanation for embarking on 
a Ph.D.). Since expected earnings would be high both in high skill crafts in 
competitive markets and in low skill crafts in uncompetitive markets, we would expect 
apprenticeship to be longer there; it would be shorter in a craft requiring low skills 
and working in competitive markets, in which expected lifetime earnings were low or 
declining (this is the explanation given by Sne1l1985 : ch.5 for the declining length of 
apprenticeship in eighteenth-century England). The model however does not explain 
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Apprenticeship in uncompetitive markets might well be a conspiracy against the 
public, as Smith averred. But just as guilds were incapable of enforcing cartel-like 
agreements over production, they seem to have been unable to impose restricted entry 
of unskilled labour into the trade. The evidence suggests that statutory restrictions on 
the number of apprentices a master could accept could be broken with relative ease 
(Hirshier 1954: 57; Thrupp 1963: 246, 264; Epstein S. 1991: 106); what is more, the 
rules seem to have allowed a degree of flexibility or discretion that enabled 
apprentices to be promoted to journeyman status before their contract had formally 
expired (Epstein S. 1991: 107, 109, 110) .15 Guild control over the labour market was 
weakened further by town governments, who frequently allowed masters to practise 
without having to enrol in the local corporation (Hirshier 1954: 57; Thrupp 1963: 246; 
Goldthwaite 1980: 259-60), and by trained artisans' ability to set up their trade outside 
the guilds ' jurisdiction (Thrupp 1963 : 280). 
If apprenticeship had been purely a means to restrict access to the guild, and at the 
same time guild rules were so easily evaded, it would be hard to explain why the 
institution survived. In fact, contracts of apprenticeship met two central and related 
needs : the master' s requirement to employ specialized labour and to be insured against 
the apprentice's opportunism, and the apprentice's need to be insured against the 
master's opportunism before embarking on the risks of specialization. The first 
precondition implies that the master would teach an apprentice only if he was 
reasonably secured against the latter's premature departure. A master had to be sure 
that he could reclaim his investment costs (that is, the time spent on training, on 
why guild requirements for the same trade could apparently vary between one and 
eight years (e.g. Goldthwaite 1980: 260), or why by contrast the English Statute of 
Artificers set a fixed term of seven years irrespective of the apprentice ' s craft. 
15 This is surely why English LP.s were granted discretion in applying the rule of 
compulsory apprenticeship up to the age of 21 (Gay Davies 1956: 2). 
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wasted materials and on daily maintenance, since most apprentices doubled as live-in 
servants) by requiring the apprentice to work for sub-market wages after formal 
training had ceased. But at that point an apprentice might well wish to leave, since he 
could earn higher wages with another master who had no training costs to recover; 
this is the well-known externality problem of training . In the absence of rules 
forbidding opportunism of this kind, no master would have willingly engaged an 
apprentice. Being unable to pass on his skills, the master would have been unable to 
expand his output and, perhaps just as importantly, would have had less incentive to 
develop his own talents .16 
The problem of opportunism arose because apprentices possessed general skills l7 
which could be employed in other workshops within the same craft and which masters 
could not control. In order to reduce this kind of opportunism, the masters required 
rights over the apprentices' labour, which they achieved by demanding long-term 
training agreements upheld by formal or informal sanction (Berengo 1965: 77-8). They 
frequently reinforced their claims by demanding entry fees (Gay Davies 1956: 10), by 
increasing apprentices ' wages during the last years of the contract, or by promising 
a pay-off to set up in the trade upon completion (Lipson 1945: 309-10; Berengo 1965: 
79; Snell 1985: 256-7), all of which raised the trainee's cost of defaulting, or by 
16 Assuming that a more highly skilled master had a better chance of attracting and 
retaining good apprentices . Conversely, an unintended consequence of apprenticeship 
may have been to develop the master' s skills by way of demonstration: teaching is the 
most effective way of improving the clarity and quality of one' s thought. 
17 General skills are acquired through training for a specific profession but are not 
specific to one firm; by contrast, generic skills are untutored and are neither craft- nor 
finn-specific . Training in general skills allowed journeymen to move between shops 
which specialized to different processes within the same, broadly defined craft. These 
issues are discussed in greater detail below. 
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enforcing criteria of eligibility to apprenticeship status based upon residence, the level 
of income or the father's occupation (Gay Davies 1956: 1, 5, 9).18 
Conversely, apprentices were also liable to opportunistic behaviour by their masters. 
They could be exploited as cheap labour to be discharged at the first dip in demand, 
without having gained the promised skills or an attestation of proficiency that would 
enable them to become journeymen and aspiring masters. The nature of apprenticeship 
made the costs of such behaviour particularly high. Because apprentices learned what 
were essentially tacit and craft-specific skills that could not be transferred through 
speech or writing, the costs of switching to a different profession or of being fired 
before achieving full proficiency were unusually high.19 Similarly to masters, 
therefore, prospective apprentices had to be given appropriate rights and incentives in 
order to invest in skills: namely , guaranteed employment for a sufficiently long period 
of time (enough to include at least one industrial cycle), prospective entry into the 
guild, and perhaps the hope of marrying into the master's family and ultimately of 
18 A similar rationale would explain the virtually universal practice of fIXing low 
or non-existent entry costs for the masters' close kin. On this view, the entry fee to 
the guild would be a mortgage on trust, used to deter lesser known masters from 
exploiting the guild for short term advantage, e.g. for stealing a guild's 'secrets'. 
19 See Winter 1989: 219-20 for a similar argument about technology and the fInn. 
This can explain why the length of apprenticeship tended to decline with age of entry, 
since older trainees would have faced higher opportunity costs for defaulting. The 
costs were not simply fmancial. Apprentices who reached the age of legal 
responsibility (generally fourteen) were required to swear an oath; having thus bound 
themselves in spirit, they got better conditions of service, often being paid some kind 
of wage (Epstein S. 1991: 104) . The best apprentice was a younger member of the 
craftsman' s family for whom no fonnal contract was required; the weight of paternal 
authority was sanction enough (ibidem: 104-5). 
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inheriting the shop. Lacking such rights and opportunities , no worker would willingly 
develop his skills and capabilities . 
We are now able to understand both the seemingly inordinate length of apprenticeship 
contracts and why the relation between that length and the required degree of skills 
is so seldom straightforward.2O Insofar as all guild-based production was based on 
craft-specific, general skills, apprenticeship contracts had to guarantee an adequate 
return to the master and a degree of security to the apprentice .21 •n Apprenticeship 
contracts were therefore a device to protect both parties' investments in skills from 
expropriation.23•24 
20 See above, n.14. 
2 1 The additional length of apprenticeship above the minimum threshold required 
to engage in skills training would be determined by the current state of the labour 
market, as discussed in n.14 above. 
n A lengthy apprenticeship also served to ' socialize' the candidate into the adult, 
professional and wage-earning world (Epstein S. 1991 : 111 , 124, 188), thereby 
reducing the chances of opportunistic or ' irrational ' behaviour by young apprentices . 
23 Conversely, when apprenticeship laws began to break down, master-apprentice 
opportunism increased sharply. For eighteenth-century England see Snell 1985: 253-8 
and Figure 5.8. 
24 It might be argued that the purpose of lengthy apprenticeship was to establish 
relations of trust. Trust however cannot explain the solution to the initial problem, 
which was how to get master and apprentice to agree; trust is merely a possible 
outcome of an existing relationship. This is not to say that the long-term survival of 
a firm did not also depend on relationships of trust, friendship and even kinship; the 
absence of trust within a craft shop would make monitoring costs impossibly high. For 
the view that the modem fmn is a non-market institution devised to establish relations 
12 
The first references to craft guilds, which invariably concern contracts of 
apprenticeship (Epstein S. 1991 : 69, 75,101 and passim), do in fact indicate that the 
institution's primary purpose was to provide its members with a pool of trained labour 
by monitoring the apprenticeship system.25 The fear that craftsmen outside the guild 
could engage in 'poaching' on the skilled labour market that others had trained, 
explains why corporations were so concerned with drawing up written contracts of 
apprenticeship (Epstein S. 1991: 76) and with establishing compulsory membership 
(Thrupp 1963: 263-4).26 The externalities of training and widespread free-riding 
would threaten investment in skills and jeopardize the very livelihood of the craftsmen. 
This explains why, notwithstanding individual exceptions, the general rule of 
compulsory membership of the guild was not challenged by the political authorities. 
As long as the number of non-guilded artisans stayed below a certain threshold the 
craft guild -- or rather, investment in skills -- would not be seriously threatened, since 
association members would still have possessed enough critical mass to sanction 
deviant behaviour effectively.27 
of trust, see Hodgson 1988: 206-11. 
25 The same argument explains why femo.le guilds were so unusual in pre-industrial 
Europe. With few exceptions , women were restricted to activities which exploited 
'female' skills connected with housework (spinning, weaving, needlework, brewing 
etc.), that were learned through the informal apprenticeship of hearth and home; see 
e.g. Hafter 1985, with references . See also below, n.33 . 
26 The view that guilds aimed to protect their members against capital 
expropriation (Hickson & Thompson 1991) fails to explain why guilds spent much of 
their time enforcing compulsory membership. Our own explanation solves the 
problem. 
27 The elaborate codes and rituals of guild behaviour, which symbolically 
reinforced the sense of membership and allegiance, further reduced the probability of 
opportunistic behaviour. 
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III 
As most academics know to their cost, specialization increases expected wages but 
restricts the range of jobs one can make a living from. Craft trainees faced a similar 
dilemma: if skills gained in one shop could not be used elsewhere, training would 
reduce rather than enhance future earnings. Masters would also be unwilling to train 
an apprentice if they could not easily fmd a replacement, and they would face 
uncertainty on the labour market if they had no means of checking the labour force 's 
quality or credentials (Gustafsson 1991 : 74, 85) . The second main function of 
apprenticeship laws was therefore to coordinate demand and supply of trained labour 
in order to reduce market uncertainty. 
By creating a pool of interchangeable skilled labour, apprenticeship buffered potential 
trainees from the risk of unemployment following random shocks to individual 
fmus ,28 and provided masters with a trained workforce to which they could resort 
in case of sudden increases in demand. This was achieved by providing certificates of 
apprenticeship which made journeymen employable across fmus (Thrupp 1963 : 280; 
Gay Davies 1956: 264 n.9) , and by guaranteeing employers a sufficiently 
homogeneous labour force from which the largest initial differences in natural skills 
and ability had been ironed out. 
As commodity and labour markets increased in size and therefore also in the scale of 
risk, institutions were devised for pooling labour skills across greater distances . 
Infonnal networks of skilled labourers had probably existed since the thirteenth 
century, particularly within itinerant trades like the building, shipping and mining 
28 In sectors with a relatively high elasticity of demand, guilds tended to be 
controlled by merchants, who were ' inclined towards drawing labour in freely while 
business was good, forcing masters to train it as fast as possible, and letting wage-
workers and the small masters look for some other occupation when business was 
poor' (Thrupp 1963: 267). 
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industries. In other trades, however, more structured organizations of journeymen 
spanning several regions or large associations of towns emerged in Germany and 
France only after the mid-fourteenth century (Geremek 1975: 118; Schulz 1987) ; 
inter-urban networks of masters' guilds also appeared at the same time (Thrupp 1963: 
254, 256-7). 
These changes29 were arguably a response to the sharp demographic downturn and 
the localized but virulent epidemics brought on by the Black Death of 1348-50, and 
to the reorganization and integration of regional markets that ensued (Epstein S.R. 
1991 and 1994). A similar phenomenon, albeit on a somewhat larger scale, of 
integration within the specialized labour market occurred in seventeenth-century 
France (Sonenscher 1989: ch.9), again at a time of demographic depression when 
regional economies were being reorganized into a fledgling national market. In both 
instances, systemic economic and demographic shocks caused large and unpredictable 
variations in local demand for skilled labour, and a significant increase in the latter' s 
mobility . In both instances, the efficient pooling of information over large distances 
on local conditions of supply and demand became a matter of pressing concern, 
particularly for skilled workers who were in especially scarce supply. Lastly , in both 
instances new interregional and 'national ' journeymen organizations , compagnonnages 
and confraternities emerged as institutional means of absorbing the effects of increased 
fluctuations in local employment which threatened craft specific, skilled labour. 
Particularly in the late Middle Ages, these organizations transcended political 
29 It is not clear whether such agreements and organizations arose in late medieval 
England. However, the Statute of Artificers of 1563 and the Settlement Acts of 1662, 
which restricted apprentice and journeyman mobility, would have made such 
arrangements well nigh impossible . 
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frontiers ; just as significantly, they seldom overcame the boundaries of a common 
culture and language. 30 
The tendency to focus on the trade union functions of journeymen' s associations 
(e.g .Zemon Davis 1966) has rather obscured the fact that those functions were a 
consequence of a far more pressing concern, the need to fmd work in highly unstable 
labour markets . While it may be the case that in the (very!) long run, the union aspect 
of journeymen's associations would become more significant, before the industrial 
revolution they seem to have functioned mainly to pool information, to provide 
support in times of need, and to lower search costs for their employers. They helped 
to distribute a smaller number of workers over a larger territory more efficiently than 
would otherwise have been possible;31 paradoxically, they made it easier for labour 
than for most commodities to cross the Ancien Regime' s innumerable jurisdictional 
boundaries . Last but far from least, they contributed to technological progress by 
disseminating technical skills . 
IV 
Pre-modern guilds contributed to technological progress through training, 
specialization, diffusion and invention. We have already discussed how apprenticeship 
and journeymen' s associations promoted training and worker specialization by 
lowering the transaction costs and uncertainty involved. We will now see how guilds 
promoted technical diffusion by establishing a system of circulating labour, and 
promoted inventiveness by providing inventors with monopoly rents . 1bis claim seems 
30 An interesting exception was the large-scale late medieval migration of German-
speaking workers to northern and central Italy (Doren 1903) . 
31 See contra Smith 1976: 150-1: the Statute of Artificers ' obstructs the free 
circulation of labour from one employment to another, even in the same place'. 
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hard to square with the guilds ' reputation for technological conservatism;32 yet for 
every episode of Luddite reaction (e.g. Thrupp 1963: 272-3; MacLeod 1988: 161; 
Mokyr 1990: 178-9, 258-9) , there are dozens of examples of technological diffusion 
through artisan migration. 
Artisans, like servants, were constantly on the move.33 For journeymen it was a way 
of life; for master artisans it could easily become so. The Huguenot migration to 
England and the wholesale transfer of artisan skills from Brabant to the Netherlands 
in response to sixteenth-century warfare are just two better known threads of an 
intricate web of technological diffusion which covered the whole of early modern 
Europe and beyond (see e.g. Thrupp 1963 : 270; Scoville 1952; Barbour 1950: 19-20; 
Mathias 1975; Rapp 1975 : 505; Hammersley 1981; Hale 1985: 229; MacLeod 1988: 
26,28,31,33,37,82,208; Ashtor 1989; Magnusson 1991: 210). Yet to state that these 
men embodied progressive forces that 'undermined' guild obscurantism (Mokyr 1990: 
233, 298) misunderstands the fact that the migration of skilled workforce was a 
structural consequence of the guild system itself. 
The reason why technological diffusion before the nineteenth century occurred 
overwhelmingly by means of artisan migration was, of course, the embodied nature 
of pre-modem technical skills. Although fundamental inventions could be published 
and made easily available, the printed word had negligible effects (CipoUa 1972). 
Technical knowledge had to be transferred, so to speak, in the flesh . It is no 
coincidence that the technologically most advanced sectors in the pre-modem economy 
32 See e.g. Kula 1976: 78: 'changes in production techniques -- and therefore 
changes in labour productivity -- are not possible in the corporate system' . 
33 Persson 1988: 69 notes how the institution of servanthood helped propagate 
agricultural technique . Snell 1985: 256-7 also draws attention to parallels between 
apprenticeship and farm service. 
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(the mining, building, shipbuilding and textile industries) also had the most mobile 
workforce (Ashtor 1989). However, causation ran both ways . The high level of skills 
involved in these sectors restricted the number of qualified workers , who were forced 
to move between production centres in response to local economic cycles .34 The 
' tacit' , embodied character of technical knowledge meant also that industrial espionage 
for rival manufacturers' 'secrets', process and other technological inventions which 
gave their owners the 'super-profits' we associate with patented inventions , could only 
be achieved by luring away an expert capable of conveying his prized knowledge by 
personal example (MacLeod 1991 : 894). 
A characteristic feature of medieval and Ancien Regime Europe made this kind of 
technological transfer easier than it might be today . The extreme political and 
jurisdictional fragmentation of the continent and the competition this engendered 
between territorial powers, meant that most craft guilds could seldom enforce their 
' secrets' beyond the town walls . Most importantly, they could do little to stop 
members from moving elsewhere, since if a guild refused to adopt an innovation it 
would be quite simple to offer it to another, more receptive jurisdiction (Hirshler 
1954: 55-6; Ashtor 1989: 20_1).35 Whereas patents aimed in principle to protect the 
grantee's rights within the boundaries of a grantor state, most pre-modem industrial 
' secrets' could rely virtually only on the legal and physical safeguards set up by the 
34 These industries may also have been more subject to cyclical fluctuations than 
ones in more protected markets less subject to exogenous shocks, e.g. warfare or 
unitive taxation. These higher risks may have contributed to restrict the supply of 
willing apprentices. 
35 Throughout this argument we are assuming that technology transfer could only 
occur between individuals with a basic training in 'general skills ' as defllled above , 
n.17. 
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manufacturer, that is, the guild itself: and these, as we have just seen, were weak 
indeed. 
Although the issue must still be examined systematically, it therefore seems inherently 
unlikely that guild secrecy played a significant part in delaying the dissemination of 
technical knowledge in pre-modem Europe. Generally moderate fixed capital 
requirements (e.g. Berengo 1965: 66-7 for Lucchese silk masters) meant that skilled 
artisans faced low entry costs to most manufactures , which in turn raised the value of 
owning a technical 'secret' to maintain a competitive edge; the larger the market and 
the higher the potential profits, the greater the incentives for technological innovation 
and for an opportunistic artisan to transfer his secret burden of knowledge to a more 
appreciative environment. 36 The best way of avoiding members' defection was thus 
to provide them with a sufficient number of exclusive 'social benefits' to raise exit 
costs above the perceived benefits of migration; we already saw that this is the most 
likely explanation for the guilds' willingness to take on a wide variety of social and 
political functions which could have been provided equally or more efficiently by other 
kinds of organisation.37 Describing the eighteenth-century silk industry in Bologna, 
Carlo Poni has recently suggested that placing restrictions on the size of members ' 
36 It was common practice among guilds to name officers who routinely (up to 
once a week) visited their members ' workshops to check the quality of the output. 
This would have ensured that master specific inventions became common patrimony 
of the whole guild over a relatively short period of time. See below, n.36 . 
37 Since the dangers of competition through dissemination of a guild ' secret' were 
highest for high value-added, export-oriented industries , we would expect guilds in 
such industries to provide proportionately greater 'non-collective social benefits ' (e.g . 
forms of political representation, tax and social security benefits etc.) than guilds 
engaged in low value-added, localized product markets. It would therefore also be less 
costly for artisans trained in the latter to defect from their guilds. 
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workshops (that is, on the nwnber of apprentices and journeymen they could take on) 
could be a further means of avoiding dissemination of trade secrets through migration 
of unemployed workers (poni 1990: 103); we saw previously, however, that these 
restrictions were seldom strictly enforced. 38 
This mode of propagating technical knowledge quite certainly increased after the mid-
fourteenth century, as interregional and international movements in commodities, 
people and ideas expanded. Indeed, improved lines of communication may well 
explain why early modern technological progress was achieved mostly through the 
development of small-scale 'micro-inventions' and the diffusion of 'best practice', 
rather than through revolutionary but isolated technical breakthroughs (Mokyr 1990). 
The widespread evidence of technology transfers can be taken as proof that guilds 
were not inherently averse to technical innovation, indeed that they welcomed it under 
certain conditions to be discussed .39 To understand this, we must shift our focus from 
diffusion to invention, and raise the question of how deliberate technological progress 
through invention could be achieved. The problem is well known: new discoveries will 
not be forthcoming if the inventor cannot claim more than his proportional share of 
the gains . Systematic invention therefore has to be promoted through non-market 
38 Another cause of artisan migration was indebtedness; this is said to have been 
the reason why Ugolino Menzoni, a silk master from Bologna, carried the secret of 
the city' s silk-throwing mill with him to Modena (Poni 1990: 121). 
39 Most artisans who decided to leave their town of origin ended up being 
integrated into a new guild (Hirshier 1954: 53). This would make technical sense, 
since only other trained workers would be able to interpret the new information 
correctly and efficiently; 'proto-industrial ' workers with generic skills would be less 
technically receptive, whatever their attitude towards new technology. I discuss proto-
industrial technology further below. 
20 
institutions. Only three solutions are available: state support for primary research, 
patent rights to discovery, and 'secrecy' and the transmission of secrets through 
training (Dasgupta & David 1988: 9, 26). But although patent rights were invented in 
the early fifteenth century, patents in their modem guise are an eighteenth- or even 
nineteenth-century invention (MacLeod 1991); this is even more the case for public 
support for basic research. This means that the only significant incentive for invention 
before the eighteenth century was the capacity to control and transmit a technical 
secret, and to capture the rent that secret provided. The most effective defender of 
rents from secrecy was, of course, the craft guild -- which incidentally was originally 
known as misterium (Long 1991: 859-60) .40 
The demonstration that guilds could monopolize existing knowledge by hindering 
technological diffusion and that they were willing to adopt 'secrets' garnered 
elsewhere does not of course prove that they were a major source of, or indeed 
capable of producing, new technical knowledge . Unfortunately , whereas the adoption 
of 'secrets ' imported from elsewhere is sufficiently well documented, the production 
of new technology within a guild is extremely hard to observe. On the one hand, the 
kinds of innovation that guilds preferred, namely process and capital saving devices 
and investment in skills (I discuss the reasons for this in the next section) , are 
inherently harder to identify than the labour saving inventions more commonly 
40 The concept of ' secrecy' misleadingly implies that the technology could be 
transmitted as formalized knowledge. However, since most pre-industrial technology 
could only be propagated by personal example, one could argue that secrecy was a 
conditio sine qua non rather than a privileged or unusual condition. See Mathias 1975: 
111-13 . A similar consideration applies to much scientific technology today (I owe the 
latter point to Mary Morgan) . 
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associated with industrialization.41 On the other hand, guilds did not advertise their 
technological advances; most 'secrets' came into the competitors' domain and appear 
in the documentary records only after they had been 'stolen' or transferred (see Long 
1991 : 858-9) . Although the patent was an institutional offshoot of the guilds ' 
' invention' of technology as a distinct sphere of human practice (Long 1991), guilds 
had no desire to make their discoveries public as the patent must do. Nor did they 
have to : corporate supervision ensured that an individual ' s discovery would spread to 
the only 'public ' that mattered, the membership of the guild itself (Epstein S. 1991 : 
140) .42,43 From there the invention could take other paths , but that was no more 
than an undesired, albeit inevitable side-effect of the gu.ild ' s limited powers of 
coercion. 
4\ Even so, the size of the gains from this kind of innovation could be striking. 
Labour productivity in the Lyonnais book industry increased by c.750 per cent 
between c.1500 and 1572, an annual rate of growth of 3 per cent. The journeymen did 
not complain (Zemon Davis 1966: 53 n.3). 
42 'Patents ... undermined [the guilds ') ethic of unrestricted communication of 
trade secrets between the freemen of a company' (MacLeod 1988: 83) . The 
importance of patenting was inversely proportional to the strength of guilds: the 
intensity of patenting in England increased sharply after 1720 as guild membership 
began to collapse (ibidem: 84, 88, 113). Nonetheless , some types of invention 
typically associated with crafts, such as improvements in technique, could not be 
patented at all (ibidem: 97-8) . 
43 This was true so long as patents were viewed as a discretionary privilege to be 
granted by the state. Only when the concept of invention as a natural human right 
emerged in the late eighteenth century did guilds lose the ab.ility to protect their rights 
and 'secrets ' as a corporate body (see Hilaire-Perez 1991 , and more broadly 
Sonenscher 1989) . 
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Invention was most likely achieved through unintended , random change or through 
economies of practice or ' learning by doing' ;44 it was probably less frequently the 
result of a deliberate search for technical advantage (persson 1988: 7; but see 
Sonenscher 1987: 62-6). What is clear, however, is that investment in s1cills and 
apprenticeship training provided a pool of constantly renewed talent which ensured a 
higher than average potential for technical invention. Improvements of this kind drew 
on what I have called 'embodied', rather than formalized knowledge. 
By contrast with the patent, which constituted a deliberate attempt by the state to 
foster inventiveness (and perhaps to an equal degree, rent-seeking), the diffusion of 
'secrets ' through the craft guild system relied upon a process of bidding by the 
invention's potential beneficiaries, including most importantly the breakaway artisan 
himself. Craft innovation was thus a by-product of the guild acting as a collective 
'firm of finns' . Even so, craft-based invention and the multi-centred, competitive 
institutional setting in which it was embedded came close to resembling an 'ideal' 
market structure for efficient innovation (Kamien & Schwartz 1982: 218-19). 4S 
V 
Both the debate on proto-industrialization and that on the rise of the centralized factory 
draw upon claims about relative technological efficiency. Both proto-industry and 
factory industry are said to have 'won out' over craft-based production because they 
44 Since most journeymen tended to be employed on short-term contracts, the 
probability of making gains from economies of practice and random experimentation 
must have been greatest among long-term apprentices . 
4S The optimal institutional balance may in fact be a system which promises 
property rights over inventions but is unable to enforce these effectively, such as the 
seventeenth-century English patent system described by Thirsk 1978, and the guild 
system as described here. 
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were (in several senses) cheaper ways of organizing manufacture. Yet claims based 
on inherent superiority cannot easily explain why the most significant feature of pre-
modem manufacture was the co-existence over several centuries of different modes of 
organization under the hegemony of craft-based production (Berg 1991) . 
By contrast with prevailing stage-theories of technological progress, I propose to 
analyze different organizations of manufacture as distinct kinds of 'firm', each of 
which was competitive within its own, specific technical and organizational matrix, 
and each of which, therefore, maintained a specific technological equilibrium. 
Following recent work by Pagano and others, I assume that each type of ' fum' 
responded to two distinct institutional and organizational pressures : to the problem of 
efficiency (resulting from the costs of monitoring the production process) on the one 
hand, and to the problem of governance (resulting from different property rights over 
capital and labour) on the other. Each type of ' firm' tended to adopt technology which 
reinforced its basic property rights , and to refuse innovations which undermined those 
rights . Each type of 'fum' therefore also promoted invention in directions that 
reinforced its existing governance structure or set of rights (Pagano 1991 a and 1991 b; 
Pagano & Rowthorn 1994) . 
The scheme draws a basic distinction between owners of capital (K) and labour (L) . 
The concept of 'asset specificity' (Williamson 1986) gives us a further distinction 
between ' (asset) specific' and 'generic' capital (K., Kg) and labour (L" Lg) 
respectively. A third major distinction can be made on the basis of monitoring costs 
(which are a function of opportunism), between easy to monitor and hard to monitor 
labour (Le and LJ.46 These categories produce eight possible permutations, of which 
seven seem to have existed in practice (fable I) . 
46 Monitoring costs and asset specificity are homologous for K. 
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Table 1. Property r i ghts and technology in pre-modern 
manufacture 
Capital 
K. K. 
e household factory 
L product ion 
L. I 
a I 
d proto-industry 
b 
0 'buying-up' system centralized 
e (Kaufsystem) manufacture 
u 
L. 
r craft manufacture joint 
d (gu ilds ) ownership 
Table 1 summarizes the distinctive features of the tw047 main types of pre-modern 
'firm' (craft production and proto-industry) along these lines. Let us take craft 
production first. Artisan fIXed capital (craft machinery) was generic and could be 
acquired at relatively low cost; apprentices and journeymen could usually expect to set 
up their own shop with a few years' savings . Since the machinery could be quite 
easily replaced, owners of capital could not engage effectively in opportunistic 
behaviour, e.g. by withdrawing from the market. The production process was thus 
controlled by skilled labour. Opportunism among trainees took the form of flight; 
opportunism among journeymen took the form of strikes , walkouts and especially 
boycotts . In both cases, the worker' s opportunism was tempered by the rights that 
apprenticeship provided: the right not to be fired in the case of apprentices, and the 
right to have one's skills recognized through certificates of training in the case of 
journeymen. 
Proto-industry occupied a more ambiguous position than craft production in this 
scheme. On the one hand, although the two shared hard to monitor labour, proto-
industrial workers based their opportunism on organizational rather than technical 
factors . Instead of withdrawing their skills, which were generic and thus easily 
substituted,48 proto-industrial workers exploited the dispersed character of production 
47 Some organizational aspects of centralized manufacture are discussed by Cerman 
1994; joint ownership companies like those formed in the Yorkshire woollen industry 
were even more uncommon (Berg 1991 : 189) . The ' buying-up' and the strictly proto-
industrial or 'putting-out' systems are distinguished by who controls access to the raw 
material ; this is in the worker's hands in the former, in the merchant's hands in the 
latter case. 
48 This is not to signify that the skills involved were inconsiderable (Berg 1991: 
177), but rather that they were part of the standard ' in-house training' and 
socialization of European rural society. See above, n.21. 
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in order to embezzle the raw materials they received from the capitalist 'putter-out' 
(Magnusson 1991: 206-10, 212-15).49 On the other hand, proto-industrial capitalists 
could also (and, historically, for the first time) engage in opportunistic behaviour, on 
the basis not of their control over the machinery (which was usually owned by the 
workers themselves) but of their superior organizational skills. Although on balance 
the latter gave capital control over labour, the equilibrium was highly unstable, since 
entrepreneurial proto-industrial workers could become capitalist putters-out simply by 
mastering the requisite organizational skills (Berg 1991: 180) . 
From this perspective, factory industry emerges as a combination of the centralized 
and machine-based features of craft-shop organization, and the generic and unskilled 
features of proto-industrial labour. To these it makes two unique contributions: it 
introduces specialized, firm-specific machinery , and it shifts the 'balance of 
opportunism' decisively in the capitalist's favour . Neither withdrawal nor 
embezzlement are any longer a strategic option for unorganized factory workers ; the 
focus of their opportunism now shifts to the use of the factory ' s specialized (e.g. 
difficult to substitute) machinery, be it through Luddite destruction or strikes. By 
contrast, for the first time withdrawal by the capitalist threatens the very livelihood 
of the worker. 
The main conclusion to be drawn from our discussion is that the balance between 
skills-intensive and capital-intensive production was a function of the prevailing 
49 Interestingly, just as apprenticeship aimed to reduce worker opportunism by 
providing him with rights to his skills, proto-industrial capitalists often responded to 
widespread embezzlement by tacitly recognizing it as a right (Magnusson 1991 : 219); 
this helped internalize the costs of monitoring proto-industrial labour. Of course, the 
problem then became one of drawing the line between ' legitimate' and ' excessive' 
pilfering. 
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property rights to labour and capital .so Following the opening remarks in this section, 
we should therefore also expect to fmd that each governance structure was biased 
towards a specific kind of invention and innovation. With respect to craft production, 
we should fmd technological choice directed towards easy to monitor capital and hard 
to monitor skills: that is, towards capital-saving, skills-enhancing, and process and 
technique innovation. This is precisely the kind of innovation which prevailed in 
England before the mid-late eighteenth century: before, that is , the country' s guild 
structure collapsed (MacLeod 1988; Snell 1985: ch.5; Griffiths , Hunt and O'Brien 
1992). The English evidence (which it seems reasonable to assume is similar in pattern 
if not in detail to that of its Continental neighbours) suggests two conclusions in 
support of our claims. First, invention and innovation favoured techniques which 
prevailing property rights in manufacture made it feasible to accept; and second, 
patentees of such inventions would have been most frequently of artisan extraction, 
since those were the technological paths along which their training tended to direct 
them. 
The reasons for this become clearer if we examine the two hypothetical alternatives 
open to master artisans , the use of unskilled labour on the one hand, or of capital-
intensive machinery on the other. Craft shops could not base production on unskilled 
labour for two reasons: initially (between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries), 
because the lack of efficient spot markets for unskilled wage labour exposed them to 
excessive risk (Grantham 1993); subsequently, because to do so would have subjected 
them to huge diseconomies of scale in comparison both with proto-industry and with 
factory production. Craft shops could not invest in capital-intensive machinery for 
similar reasons : initially, because medieval and early modern spot markets in capital 
so This discussion implies that the concept of 'human capital ' is an oxymoron: the 
reduction of 'labour' to 'capital ' belies their very different (indeed, historically 
alternative) organizational requirements . 
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goods did not exist,51 and because the use of fum-specific capital stock within highly 
unstable markets exposed producers to excessive risk; subsequently, because capital-
intensive innovations would have devalued investments in existing skills and destroyed 
any incentive to invest in new ones . Craftsmen and their guilds opposed capital-
intensive innovations and investments not as a matter of principle, but only where 
these risked devaluing skills, whether directly by substituting general with generic 
wage labour, or indirectly by raising flXed capital costs in the industry and by shifting 
control from the owners of skills to the owners of capital (Zemon Davis 1966: 53 ; 
DuPlessis & Howell 1982: 68-70, 71, 79) . This in rum suggests that medieval and 
early modern artisans' notorious ' attachment to democratic equality or independence' 
(Thrupp 1963 : 272-3) and aversion to developments that would raise fixed capital 
costs of entry to the trade were grounded first and foremost in technological , rather 
than in ideological concerns . 
Although it has been claimed that proto-industry promoted technological invention and 
innovation, our analysis points to the opposite conclusion. Balancing as it were half 
way between skills-intensive craft production and capital-intensive factory production, 
proto-industry seems to have been a dead end for technical invention (Coleman 1973; 
MacLeod 1988: 102; Magnusson 1991 : 202). Proto-industry also found it difficult 
(albeit not impossible) to incorporate innovation from outside while remaining 
unchanged : since major technical innovation caused either labour skilling or capital 
intensification, proto-industry had a spontaneous tendency to move either 'back' into 
craft production, ' forwards ' into factory industrialism, or ' sideways ' into sweat-shops 
51 Even if high cost machinery had been available for lease, master artisans would 
still have faced higher costs than capitalists for reasons of moral hazard: artisans 
would have had fewer incentives than capitalists to maintain the capital equipment in 
good shape . 
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(Berg 1991 : 181) . S2 This technologically-induced disequilibrium of the proto-
industrial governance structure provides a simple explanation to the long-standing 
puzzle, why proto-industry so seldom spawned factory industry proper and why it just 
as easily transformed into craft-based production (Reddy 1984: 49-50; Berg 1991 : 
181). The single area in which proto-industry may have developed innovative skills 
among its practitioners was, as indicated above, that of industrial organization.s3 
VI 
Ancient prejudice notwithstanding, the governance structure of craft production and 
of its handmaiden, the guild, was not technologically inefficient. Once it had passed 
the threshold of simple household production, pre-modern manufacture was forced to 
resort to a specialized workforce; urban guilds and apprenticeship emerged jointly in 
the eleventh or twelfth century to solve the moral hazard involved in training skilled 
labour. 
As for the historical origins of guilds and apprenticeship we need be no more specific. 
We need not assume that these institutions were the outcome of conscious choice; craft 
guilds could easily have been ' selected ' randomly and then reproduced once their 
positive welfare effects had been (vaguely) recognized.S4 On the other hand, I have 
argued that the long-term survival of craft guilds was a result of their favourable 
S2 Organizational instability would explain why proto-industrial workers could be 
averse to technological innovation (Mokyr 1990: 257) . 
S3 This may have been due to the ability of proto-industrial production to respond 
flexibly to large short-term fluctuations in demand, which was also its most significant 
organizational advantage over craftsmanship and factory production. 
S4 A neo-Darwinian model would better explain why craft guilds of the kind I have 
described seem to have developed only in medieval Europe. 
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technological consequences, due in particular to the institution of apprenticeship . 55 
For centuries, arrangements that could not provide equivalent or superior technology 
were either 'selected out' by craft-based guild production, specialized like proto-
industry to low-skill manufactures in which they could maintain an unstable 
comparative advantage (Persson 1988: 57-8), or were forced like centralized 
manufacture to inhabit technologically sophisticated but institutionally restricted niches 
(Cennan 1994) .56 
55 It is notable that the capitalist-style woollen cloth manufactures which briefly 
emerged in early fourteenth-century Florence and Flanders did not survive the wave 
of worker revolts and the demographic collapse of that century , but were 'downsized' 
into a combination of small-scale workshops and dispersed rural putting-out (proto-
industry) . Merchants of early modern Leiden and Lille supported skills-intensive crafts 
against the development of proto-industrial or 'capital ist-style' manufacture (DuPlessis 
& Howell 1982) for similar reasons : capital-intensive factory production was still not 
a feasible technological equilibrium. 
56 1bis argument does not require that guilds be initially aware of the beneficial 
technological side-effects of apprenticeship. However, increasing artisan and 
journeyman mobility would have raised members' awareness of technological 
progress . The invention of the patent, which for the first time established the 
intellectual distinctiveness of technical knowledge, was a logical development of this 
process (Long 1991) . 
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